LIÇÃO 13 - As Maneiras Pelas Quais as Coisas São Anteriores e Posteriores
TEXTO DE ARISTÓTELES – Capítulo 11: 1018b 9-1019a 14
457. Diz-se que as coisas são anteriores e posteriores na medida em que há algo primário ou princípio em cada classe; pois anterior significa o que está mais próximo de algum princípio determinado, seja de modo absoluto e por natureza, seja relativamente, ou em referência ao lugar, ou de certas outras maneiras.
458. Por exemplo, uma coisa é anterior em lugar porque está mais próxima de algum lugar determinado naturalmente, como o meio ou o extremo, ou de um que depende do acaso. E o que está mais distante é posterior.
459. Outras coisas são anteriores no tempo. Pois algumas são anteriores porque estão mais distantes do presente, como no caso das coisas que já aconteceram. Assim, a guerra de Troia é anterior à dos Medos porque está mais distante do presente. E outras são anteriores no tempo porque estão mais próximas do presente, como no caso de eventos futuros; pois os Jogos Nemeus são anteriores aos Píticos porque estão mais próximos do presente, desde que se tome o presente como princípio ou ponto primário.
460. Outras coisas são anteriores no movimento; pois o que está mais próximo de um primeiro motor é anterior; por exemplo, o menino é anterior ao homem. E isso também é uma espécie de princípio em sentido absoluto. Outras coisas são anteriores em potência; pois tudo que supera outro em potência, ou é mais poderoso, é anterior. E tal é aquilo conforme cuja vontade outra coisa, isto é, uma coisa posterior, necessariamente se segue, porque se um não se move, o outro não é movido, e se um se move, o outro é movido; e a vontade é um princípio.
461. Outras coisas são anteriores na disposição, e estas são as coisas que têm um lugar diferente em relação a alguma coisa determinada segundo algum plano; por exemplo, aquele que está em segundo lugar é anterior ao que está em terceiro; e entre as cordas da lira, a paranete é anterior à nete. Pois num caso, é o líder que é tomado como princípio ou ponto de partida; e no outro, é a corda do meio. Essas coisas, então, são ditas anteriores dessa maneira.
462. De outro modo, o que é anterior no conhecimento é considerado anterior em sentido absoluto. E de tais coisas, algumas são anteriores de maneira diferente, pois umas são anteriores em referência à razão, e outras em referência aos sentidos. Pois os universais são anteriores em referência à razão, mas os singulares em referência aos sentidos.
463. E na estrutura inteligível, o atributo é anterior ao todo, como "músico" é anterior a "homem músico". Pois a estrutura inteligível não é completa sem uma de suas partes, e "homem músico" não pode existir a menos que haja alguém que seja músico.
464. Além disso, os atributos das coisas anteriores são ditos anteriores, como a retidão é anterior à lisura; pois a primeira é uma propriedade da linha considerada em si mesma, e a segunda é uma propriedade da superfície. Algumas coisas, então, são ditas anteriores e posteriores dessa maneira.
465. Mas outras são ditas anteriores por natureza e por substância, a saber, todas aquelas que podem existir sem outras, embora outras não possam existir sem elas; e esta é a divisão que Platão utilizou. E como o termo ente é usado de muitas maneiras, o sujeito primeiro é anterior, e portanto a substância é anterior. E as coisas que existem em potência e as que existem em ato são anteriores de várias maneiras. Pois algumas coisas são anteriores por serem em potência, e outras por serem em ato; por exemplo, potencialmente a metade de uma linha é anterior à linha inteira, e uma parte é anterior ao todo, e a matéria é anterior à substância. Mas em referência à atualidade, elas são posteriores; pois quando o todo é dissolvido em tais partes, elas existirão em ato.
466. Em certo sentido, então, todas as coisas que são anteriores e posteriores são ditas tais dessa última maneira. Pois algumas coisas podem existir sem outras no que se refere ao processo de geração (como o todo sem as partes), e outras novamente sem outras no que se refere ao processo de corrupção (como as partes sem o todo). O mesmo se aplica em outros casos.
COMENTÁRIO
Anterior e posterior
936. Tendo apresentado os vários sentidos dos termos que significam as partes da unidade, aqui Aristóteles dá aqueles que significam ordem, a saber, anterior e posterior. Pois a unidade implica certa ordem, porque a essência da unidade consiste em ser um princípio, como foi dito acima (872). Com relação ao primeiro, ele faz duas coisas. Primeiro, indica o significado comum dos termos anterior e posterior; e segundo (936), apresenta os vários sentidos em que esses termos são comumente tomados ("Por exemplo, uma coisa").
Ele diz, portanto, primeiro, que o significado do termo anterior depende do significado do termo princípio (ou ponto de partida); pois o princípio em cada classe de coisas é o que é primeiro nessa classe, e o termo anterior significa o que está mais próximo de algum princípio determinado. Ora, a relação entre um princípio desse tipo e algo próximo a ele pode ser considerada de vários pontos de vista. Pois algo é um princípio ou coisa primária seja de modo absoluto e por natureza (como um pai é princípio de um filho), seja "relativamente", isto é, em relação a algo extrínseco (por exemplo, algo que é posterior por natureza é dito anterior em relação a outra coisa). As coisas que são anteriores neste último sentido são tais seja em referência ao conhecimento, seja à perfeição, seja à dignidade, ou de alguma maneira semelhante. Ou uma coisa também é dita princípio e anterior em referência ao lugar; ou mesmo de certas outras maneiras.
937. Then he gives the various ways in which things are said to be prior and subsequent. And since the terms prior and subsequent are used in reference to some principle, and a principle is what is first either in being or in becoming or in knowledge (as has been stated above 1404:C 761]), this part is therefore divided into three sections.
In the first he explains how a thing is said to be prior in motion and in quantity, because the order found in motion flows from that found in quantity. For the prior and subsequent in motion depends on the prior and subsequent in continuous quantity, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. Second (946), he shows how one thing is said to be prior to another in knowledge (“In another way”). Third (950), he explains how one thing is said to be prior to another in being, i.e., in nature (“But others”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how one thing is said to be prior and another subsequent in quantity in the case of continuous things; and second (944), how one thing is prior and another subsequent in the case of discrete things (“Other things are prior in arrangement”).
938. In treating the first member of this division he gives three ways in which things are prior.
(1) The first has to do with place; for example, a thing is said to be prior in place inasmuch as it is nearer to some determinate place, whether that place be the middle point in some continuous quantity or an extreme. For the center of the world, to which heavy bodies gravitate, can be taken as the principle (or starting point) of the order involving place, and then we put the elements in the following. order, saying that earth is first, water second, and so on. Or the outermost sphere can be taken as the principle, and then we say that fire is first, air second, and so on.
939. Now nearness to a principle of place, whatever it may be, can be taken in two ways: (a) in one way with reference to an order naturally determined, as water is naturally nearer to the middle of the universe than air, and air nearer to the extreme, i.e., the outermost sphere; (b) and in another way with reference to an order that depends “on chance,” i.e., insofar as some things have a certain order purely as a result of chance, or on some other cause than nature. For example, in the case of stones which lie on top of one another in a heap, the highest is prior according to one order, and the lowest according to another. And just as what is nearest to a principle is prior, in a similar way what is farther away from a principle is subsequent.
940. Other things are prior in time (459).
(2) Things are understood to be prior and subsequent in a second way with reference to the order in time. And he now describes this order, saying that other things are said to be prior in time, and this in various ways. For some things are prior because they are farther away from the present, as occurs “in the case of things which have taken place,” i.e., past events. For the Trojan wars are said to be prior to those of the Medes and the Persians (in which Xerxes, the king of the Persians and Medes, fought against the Greeks), because they are farther away from the present. And some things are said to be prior because they are closer or nearer to the present; for example, Meneleus is said to be prior to Pyrrho because he is nearer to some present moment in reference to which each was future. But this text seems to be false, because both of them lived before the time of Aristotle, when these words were written. And it is said in the Greek that the Nemean are prior to the Pythian, these being two holidays or feasts one of which was nearer to the moment at which these words were written although both were future.
941. Now it is clear that in this case we are using the present as a principle or starting point in time, because we say that something is prior or subsequent on the grounds that it is nearer to or farther away from the present. And those who hold that time is eternal must say this; for, when this is supposed, the only principle or starting point of time which can be taken is one that relates to some present moment, which is the middle point between the past and the future, inasmuch as time might proceed to infinity in both directions.
942. Other thins are prior in motion (460).
(3) The term prior is used in a third way with reference to the order in motion; and (a) he first shows how this applies to natural things. He says that some things are said to be prior in the order found in motion; for what is nearer to a first cause of motion is prior. A boy, for example, is prior to a man because he is nearer to his primary mover, i.e., the one begetting him. And the latter is also said to be prior because of his nearness to some principle. For that—the one moving and begetting—is in a sense a principle, though not in just any way at all (as happened in the case of place), but in an absolute sense and by nature. (b) Second, he also mentions this order of motion in the realm of the voluntary, saying that some things are said to be prior in power, as men who are placed in positions of authority. For one who surpasses another in power, or is more powerful, is said to be prior. This is the order of dignity.
943. Now it is evident that this order also involves motion; for one who is more powerful, or surpasses another in power, is one “according to whose will,” i.e., intention, something necessarily follows, because it is through him that some subsequent thing is put in motion. Hence, when the more powerful or prior does not move, no subsequent thing moves; but when the former moves, the latter is also moved. This is the position of a prince in a state; for it is by his authority that others are moved to carry out the things which he commands, and if he does not command them they do not move. And it is clear that the term prior is used here too because of the nearness of a thing to some principle. For “the will,” i.e., the intention, of the ruler is taken here as a principle, and those who are nearer to the ruler, and therefore prior, are the ones through whom his commands are made known to his subjects.
944. Other things are prior in arrangement (461).
He now explains how a thing is prior in the order found among discrete things. He says that some things are said to be prior in order only because they (the associated things) have some kind of arrangement, and not because of continuity, as happened in the previous cases. And things of this kind have a different place in relation to some one determinate thing from a given point of view, as one who stands second and one who stands third —the one who stands second being prior to the one who stands third. By one who stands second is meant one who stands next to someone, such as a king; and by one who stands third is meant one who stands third from the king. Hence another text reads, “The leader is prior to the one who stands third.” It is evident, then, that things are understood to have different places inasmuch as one is second and another third. And in a similar way the paranete is prior to the nete; for among the strings of the lyre the low-pitched string is called the hypate; the high-pitched, the nete; and the middle, the mese. And the paranete refers to that which is next to the nete and nearer to the mese.
945. It is also evident that something is said to be prior here because of its nearness to some principle, although this happens differently in both of the examples given above. For in the former case—that of one who stands second and one who stands third—the thing which is taken as a principle is a real starting point and extreme, namely, the one who is highest among them, or the chief of the others, as a king or some other person of this kind. But in the case of the strings of the lyre it is the middle one, i.e., the middle string, termed the mese, that is taken as the principle; and since those which are nearer to this are called the paranete, the paranete are therefore said to be prior to the nete. These things are said to be prior in this way, then, i.e., by the order in quantity, whether continuous or discrete.
946. In another way (462).
Here he shows how one thing is said to be prior to another in knowledge. Now what is prior in knowledge is also prior in an absolute sense and not in a qualified one, as was the case with place; for a thing is known through its principles. But since knowledge is twofold: intellectual or rational, and sensory, we say that things are prior in one way in reference to reason, and in another in reference to the senses.
947. He gives three ways in which something is prior in reference to reason or intellectual knowledge:
(1) First, there is the way in which universals are prior to singulars, although the opposite occurs in the case of sensory knowledge because there singulars are prior. For reason has to do with universals and the senses with singulars; and thus the senses know universals only accidentally inasmuch as they know the singular of which the universals are predicated. For a sense knows man inasmuch as it knows Socrates, who is a man; and in the opposite way the intellect knows Socrates inasmuch as it knows man. But what is essential is always prior to what is accidental.
948. And in the intelligible structure (463).
(2) Here he gives the second way in which a thing is prior in reference to reason. He says that in the intelligible structure “the attribute is prior to the whole,” i.e., to the composite of subject and attribute; thus “musical man” cannot be known without grasping the meaning of the part “musical.” And in the same way all other simple things are prior in intelligibility to the composite, although the opposite is true from the viewpoint of the senses; for it is composite things which are first offered to the senses.
949. Again, the attributes (464).
(3) Then he gives the third way. He says that the attributes of prior things are also said to be prior from the viewpoint of reason, as straightness is said to be prior to smoothness. For straightness is an essential property of a line, and smoothness a property of surface, and a line is naturally prior to surface. But from the viewpoint of the senses surface is prior to a line, and the attributes of composite things are prior to those of simple ones. These things, then, are said to be prior in this way, namely, according to the order in knowing.
950. But others (465).
He then gives the ways in which a thing is said to be prior according to the order in being, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives three ways in which a thing is said to be prior in being; and second (953), he reduces them to one (“In a sense, then”).
He says, first, that some things are said to be prior in being, i.e., “in nature and substance,” or according to the natural order in being. And this is so for three reasons:
(1) First, priority is attributed because of community or dependence; and according to this those things are said to be prior which can exist without others, although others cannot exist without them. And one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed, as is stated in the Categories. “This is the division,” i.e., the mode of division of prior and subsequent, which Plato used against others; for it was because of community or dependence that he wanted universals to be prior in being to singular things, surfaces prior to bodies, lines to surfaces, and numbers to all other things.
951. (2) Second, things are said to be prior in being because of the relationship of substance to accident. For since the term being is used in many senses and not univocally, all senses of being must be reduced to one primary sense, according to which being is said to be the subject of other things and to subsist of itself. Hence the first subject is said to be prior; and thus substance is prior to accident.
952. Third, things are said to be prior in being inasmuch as being is divided into the actual and the potential. For a thing is said to be prior in one way potentially and in another actually. A thing is said to be prior potentially in the sense that half a line is prior to an entire line, and any part to its whole, and matter “to substance,” i.e., to form. For all of the first things mentioned in these instances are related to the others, to which they are said to be prior, as something potential to something actual. However, from the viewpoint of actuality the first things mentioned are said to be subsequent, since they become actual only by the dissolution of some whole. For when a whole is dissolved into its parts, the parts then begin to exist actually.
953. In a sense, then (466).
Here he concludes that all of the ways in which the terms prior and subsequent are used can be reduced to the last one given; and especially to the first of these inasmuch as the term prior means something which can exist without other things, but not the reverse. For from the viewpoint of generation some things can exist without others, and it is in this way that a whole is prior to its parts; for when a whole has been generated its parts do not exist actually but only potentially. And from the viewpoint of corruption some things can exist without others; for example, the parts can exist without the whole after the whole has been corrupted and dissolved into its parts. And in the same way too the other senses of prior and subsequent can be reduced to this sense. For it is certain that prior things do not depend upon subsequent ones, but the reverse. Hence all prior things can exist without subsequent ones, but not the reverse.